At the British Institute of Human Rights this is something we hear a lot, especially when we’re working on the care and treatment received by people with learning disabilities and capacity issues. Usually it’s a question that is well-meaning, but one which reveals deep-grained attitude that fails to recognise the most basic human rights we all have to be treated with equal dignity and respect. On 19 March the Supreme Court confronted this issue when deciding whether the care arrangements for P, MIG and MEG amounted to a deprivation of their right to liberty (also known as the Cheshire West case).
This is an important case. It case is illustrates why and how the Human Rights Act should be the lens through which to view other laws and day to day practices. It has the potential to transform the way people in local authorities and those caring for others (especially involving the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards and Mental Capacity Act) make decisions about people’s lives which put the person and their rights at the centre of the process, rather than relying on “best intentions”.
The Care Arrangements of P, MIG and MEG
P was a 38 year old man with Down’s syndrome and cerebral palsy who was cared for by 24 hour staff, in a house along with two other residents. He needed help with all aspects of daily life and went on accompanied trips out of the home almost every day. MIG and MEG were teenage sisters with learning disabilities who had been removed from a neglectful home. MIG lived with a foster mother whom the court noted she adored and MEG lived in an NHS facility for learning disabled adolescents. Both girls attended the same college during the day.
In MIG’s case she never attempted to leave the foster home by herself but would have been restrained from doing so it she had tried. MEG was sometimes physically restraint and received tranquillising medication. P was sometimes restrained in response to challenging behaviour.
Before the case got to the Supreme Court
The cases started in the Court of Protection, where it was found that P’s arrangements did amount to a deprivation of liberty, but as this was in his best interests it should continue, but with safeguards, including review. MIG and MEG’s care arrangements were found to be in their best interests and not a deprivation of their liberty, and thus not be subject to review.
The Court of Appeal agreed that MIG and MEG’s were not deprived of Liberty, noting the “relative normality” of their situation. The Court also overturned the decision on P, finding that it was not a deprivation of liberty, introducing the idea of comparing P’s life to that of an adult in a similar situation with similar disabilities.
What the Supreme Court said
In P’s case the Supreme Court was unanimous that his situation amounted to a deprivation of liberty, and by a majority (4 to 3) they also found the MIG and MEG had been deprived of their liberty. The leading judgement was delivered by Baroness Hale and it well worth the read, making it clear that human rights are universal to all and not lost simply because someone may have capacity issues.
The key point those involved in decision-making and delivery of care arrangements should bear in mind is that the test for whether a person is deprived of their liberty is whether they are “under the complete supervision and control of the staff and not free to leave”. The person’s compliance or lack of objection, the “relative normality” of the placement and the purpose behind it are all irrelevant to this objective question.
So what’s the harm?
Well quite a lot actually. As Lady Hale says in her judgement:
…people with disabilities, both mental and physical, have the same human rights as the rest of the human race…This flows inexorably from the universal character of human rights, founded on the inherent dignity of all human beings…Far from disability entitling the state to deny such people human rights: rather it places upon the state (and upon others) the duty to make reasonable accommodation to cater for the special needs of those with disabilities…
“If it would be a deprivation of my liberty to be obliged to live in a particular place, subject to constant monitoring and control, only allowed out with close supervision, and unable to move away without permission even if such an opportunity became available, then it must also be a deprivation of the liberty of a disabled person. The fact that my living arrangements are comfortable, and indeed make my life as enjoyable as it could possibly be, should make no difference. A gilded cage is still a cage. (our emphasis)
Making rights real
Whether this case will indeed transform practice now depends on the extent to which practitioners are made aware not only of this case but of why and how human rights are relevant to their work (and not simply about the legal team). At BIHR we run a range of training and capacity building services and projects and we’ll certainly be raising awareness through our work. We have recently been supporting people and groups to give evidence to the Mental Capacity Act Committee, which found some significant gaps in the protection of people’s human rights. You can read our response to the Committee here and the evidence we submitted here.
Ultimately the British Institute of Human Rights is a charity, with no statutory mandate (or funding) to drive forward work to put human rights at the heart of health and care. That is why we work hard to form partnerships with service providers, practitioner bodies, regulators and advocacy services to help people know and understand their rights and duties and put them into practice (check out our new resource “The Difference it Makes”). Indeed, we were pleased that the Care Quality Commission recently recommended that all advocacy services and detaining authorities should distribute BIHR’s Mental Health Advocacy and Human Rights: Your Guide.
As the new structures for health and social care take root, we very much hope to work with NHS England, the Department of Health, CCGs and others involved in the system, to make sure that people’s basic rights are respected and protected.
 P v Cheshire West and Chester Council  UKSC 19